Going Private: Who Shall Provide the Remedies? by Thomas, Lawrence W.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 51 
Number 1 Volume 51, Fall 1976, Number 1 Article 4 
July 2012 
Going Private: Who Shall Provide the Remedies? 
Lawrence W. Thomas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas, Lawrence W. (1976) "Going Private: Who Shall Provide the Remedies?," St. John's Law Review: 
Vol. 51 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol51/iss1/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
GOING PRIVATE: WHO SHALL PROVIDE
THE REMEDIES?
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of "going private," by which publicly owned
companies return to private ownership, is one of the consequences
of the recent depressed market for equity securities.' The poor mar-
ket has caused substantial reductions in price/earnings ratios for
shares of stock generally, and in some cases has resulted in sales of
shares at prices far below book value.2 Since lower share prices
necessarily result in less capital for the publicly owned corporation,
compliance with the Securities and Exchange Commission's re-
quirements governing public corporations now often appears to be
a proportionately greater burden for these corporations to bear in
order to maintain public financing.3 Accordingly, majority share-
holders of several corporations have taken measures designed to
concentrate ownership of the corporation in a sufficiently small
number of hands to allow them to "go private" and thus delist the
corporation with the SEC.'
There are several devices available to majority shareholders
who wish to rid the corporation of its minority interests.5 Some of
I For many smaller public corporations the recent extended period of poor market condi-
tions has meant that they could expect relatively little increased capital through public
financing. Many of these corporations, after reconsidering the benefits and burdens of public
ownership, have decided that their interests can be better served by going private. The
resultant trend to go private has been much noted and discussed. See, e.g., Borden, Going
Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Borden]; Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Brudney]; Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44
FORDHAM L. REv. 796 (1976); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Yale Note].
2 The market factors influencing corporations to go private have been reported and
analyzed in the financial media. See, e.g., Lee, Why Companies Want to Go Private, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 15, 1974, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 14, col. 3. Seegenerally Yale Note, supra
note 1, at 903 & nn.1-5.
2 The cost of being a public corporation, including auditing and legal fees, shareholder
relations, annual meetings, transfer agents, and stock certificates, has been estimated at
between $75,000 and $200,000 annually for the average corporation listed on the American
Stock Exchange. A major portion of these costs would be eliminated by going private. Borden,
supra note 1, at 1007.
1 A corporation having a total of less than 300 shareholders may deregister with the SEC.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1970).
- Details of the various types of going private transactions which have been used are
provided in Borden, supra note 1, at 990-1002. See also 3 A. BROMBERO, SECURTImS LAw § 4.7,
at 400.2 (Supp. 1975); 2 J. FLOM, M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND
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the principal means used, either alone or in combination, are cash
tender offers' for minority shares, made either by the corporation or
the majority shareholders; 7 cash mergers;" reverse stock splits; ' and
offers by the corporation to exchange debentures for minority
shares.'" Probably the most common device is a two-step procedure
involving a tender offer to acquire control, followed by a cash
merger" to eliminate, or freeze out, the nontendering minority. Fre-
TAKEOUTS-TENDER OFFERS AND GOING PRIVATE 9-17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TAKEOVERS
AND TAKEOUTS].
6 A tender offer may be defined as "a written offer to purchase within a specified period
of time a quantity of corporate securities for cash or other securities, usually securities of the
offeror, at a stated price or exchange ratio." Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate
Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33, 34 (1975). Tender offers have become the most
commonly used method of acquiring control of public corporations. Id. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the tender offer process, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHOIN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL (1973).
Holders of the majority interest in a corporation may cause the corporation to tender
for its own shares or, alternatively, may transfer their interests to a newly formed corporation
in return for all of the new corporation's stock, and then cause the new corporation to tender
for the minority shares of the first corporation.
8 In a cash merger, the minority shareholders of the transferor corporation receive cash
for their shares. It is more customary for shareholders of the acquired corporation to receive
stock or other securities in the surviving corporation. See TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUrS, supra
note 5, at 10. For an excellent analysis of the types of mergers used in freeze-outs generally,
see Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Greene]. There, the author postulates that there are three distinct types
of freeze-out mergers, each of which involves different policy considerations and hence calls
for a different type of analysis. The first two types involve combinations of two ongoing
businesses. Greene concludes that these should normally be allowed. Id. at 508-12. The third
type, that commonly found in going private transactions, involves the use of a shell corpora-
tion as an intermediary created solely for the purpose of freezing out minority shareholders.
Greene concludes that the policy considerations favoring corporate flexibility do not require
that the majority be entitled to eject the minority at will, and thus this type of freeze-out
merger should be banned. Id. at 518-19.
1 The reverse stock split is one of the more ingenious devices used to freeze-out minority
interests. The freeze-out is made possible because many states allow corporations to eliminate
fractional shares of stock by cash payment. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 155 (1974); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 509(b) (McKinney 1963). Thus, where the majority interest is concen-
trated in blocks substantially larger than the blocks held by the minority shareholders, the
corporation may reclassify its shares into fractions small enough so that the largest minority
shareholder will have only a fraction of a full share and hence may be cashed out. See, e.g.,
Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), appeal dismissed,
422 U.S. 1002 (1975) (1 for 600 split).
"o See Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afJ'd per curiam, 514
F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975) (offer to exchange $3 cash and $8 principal amount of 10% subordi-
nated sinking fund debentures per share).
1 See, e.g., Tanzer Economic Assocs. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167,
383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976). While most freeze-out cases have involved
the use of a cash merger to eliminate minority interests, whether the freeze-out device is a
reverse stock split, exchange of definite term debentures, or even the more primitive tech-
nique of a sale of corporate assets followed by dissolution, the same general considerations
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quently, a new corporation is created solely for this purpose.' 2 If
control of a sufficiently large number of shares has been gained by
the tender offer, the corporation may be able to effect a merger
pursuant to a short-form merger statute;' 3 if not, the corporation
must utilize the long-form merger procedure."
Typically, decisions as to whether a public corporation should
go private, how much compensation should be paid to the minority
for their shares, and how and when the transaction should be effec-
tuated are made exclusively by a control group comprised of the
corporation's largest shareholders. This control group, now seeking
the return of the corporation to private ownership and thus to their
own exclusive control, may well be the very same group which took
the corporation public a relatively short time before, perhaps by
selling its shares at a price several times higher than that to be
offered the frozen-out minority for their shares.'5 Frequently, there
apply. For an illustration of a freeze-out accomplished by the sale of corporate assets followed
by dissolution, see Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 675 (1942).
12 See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Inc., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974). The usual procedure involves a transfer by the majority of their shares in the
corporation to a new corporation created solely for the purpose of the merger in return for all
of the new corporation's shares. The majority then votes for a merger of the two corporations,
with provisions for the minority shareholders to receive cash for their shares, subject to state
law appraisal rights.
11 Short-form merger statutes generally provide that if a sufficient number of shares,
usually 90% or 95%, is held by the majority, approval of the merger by shareholder vote is
not necessary. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974) (90%); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1976) (95%). If the required total is reached, the insiders may simply form
a new corporation which can be merged with the public corporation pursuant to a simple
resolution by the board of directors. No stockholders' meeting is necessary and no SEC filings
are required. At present, some 38 states have some type of short form merger statute. See
Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 n.1 (2d Cir.) (Moore, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
11 Long-form mergers are those which are carried out according to the general state
merger statute. While shareholder approval is required, most modern merger statutes, in the
interest of corporate flexibility, have provided that such approval may be obtained even in
the face of a substantial dissenting minority. The Delaware merger statute, for example,
provides that a merger may be accomplished upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the
shareholders. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(c) (1974). Cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903(a)(2) (McKin-
ney 1963) (two-thirds vote required for approval). Long-form mergers are slightly more favora-
ble to the minority than short-form mergers due to their notice requirements through which
the minority may be afforded an additional remedy, viz., an injunction.
15 See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), remanded for determi-
nation of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976), discussed in notes 76-90 and accompanying text
infra; Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d
283 (2d Cir. 1975). In Kaufmann, Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc., an advertising agency, went
public in 1968 by selling 409,000 of its shares at $17.50 per share. By 1974 the price of the
stock had fallen to $5.50 per share, and the company's management decided to take the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:131
are other aspects of going private which the minority shareholders
find objectionable. Often there is no valid business purpose for the
change."6 Further, the going private device may be financed with
corporate assets. 17 The board of directors of the corporation going
private may be completely controlled by insiders, with the freeze-
out victims having no voice and no real chance to affect the out-
come. 8 The merger used to squeeze out the minority sometimes
involves only the public corporation and a "shell" intermediary
created solely for the purpose, rather than another ongoing busi-
ness.'" Finally, the appraisers who value the minority shares are
usually selected and retained by the controlling interests and may
be of questionable independence.2 0
While the benefits of going private that accrue to the majority
shareholders and insiders of a public corporation are usually readily
apparent and tangible,2 1 any benefits to the corporation's minority
interests2 2 or to the corporation itself23 are often much more difficult
corporation private by means of an exchange of cash and debentures worth about $9 per share
for the minority shares.
"1 The existence of a proper business purpose has been viewed by many as perhaps the
single most important determinant of whether a corporation should be allowed to freeze-out
its minority shareholders. See, e.g., Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974)
(mem.). The business purpose test was suggested by the SEC in a proposed regulation de-
signed to curb abuses by majority shareholders in such situations. See Proposed Rule 13e-
3B, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,231 (Feb. 6, 1975), as appearing in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 23,704-05. The proposed rule is discussed in notes 73-75 and accompanying text
infra.
17 See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1279 (2d Cir.), remanded for
determination of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976).
IA While it is invariably the case that the insiders seeking to take the corporation private
will have control of a sufficient number of shares to ensure the success of the venture, it is
not necessarily true that the freeze-out victims will have no voice and no opportunity to affect
the outcome. See, e.g., Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976), where the insiders agreed to vote its shares for the merger only if a
majority of the minority public shareholders did so and if a business reason for the merger
was advanced.
1" See note 12 supra. See also Greene, supra note 8, at 495-96, 519.
See, e.g., People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 121, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afl'd per curiam, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't
1975).
21 It is obvious that when a corporation buys back recently issued shares for a price
substantially less than the issue price the corporation realizes a profit. It is also obvious that
the benefits of this profit will accrue only to those who are still shareholders in the corpora-
tion. Further, it is the majority shareholders and insiders who are relieved of the burden of
SEC registration liability. See Yale Note, supra note 1, at 905-06. See generally Brudney,
supra note 1.
22 The only benefit to minority shareholders who are frozen out by a corporation going
private is the premium over present market value which they may receive for their stock. See
note 15 supra. However, this potential benefit is often precluded by the fact that the majority,
who are in complete control of the going private mechanism, will usually choose a time when
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to discern. Further, inasmuch as the control group will often have
such complete control of the going private mechanism that they can
entirely disregard the interests of the minority, the process can eas-
ily be abused. There is, therefore, a need for an effective means of
controlling these transactions. Before any effective regulation of
the going private process can be provided, it is necessary to deter-
mine how these transactions should be regulated and who should do
the regulating.
The alternative sources of regulatory power over going private
transactions are the corporation laws of the individual states and
the federal securities laws as enforced by either the federal courts
or the SEC. Proponents of state regulation maintain that since cor-
porations are creatures of the state, internal corporate activities
such as those involved in going private should be regulated by the
state.2s Advocates of a federal theory of regulation have premised
their arguments on the assumption that the only state law remedy
readily available in this type of transaction is the often inadequate
exercise of appraisal rights by the minority.5 Recently, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a federal theory of
regulation, allowing relief to shareholders frozen out in going private
the stock is selling at a low price to go private. Hence, any premium over market value is
often illusory, and it is much more likely that the price which the minority shareholders
receive will be unfair.
"2 The most obvious advantage to the corporation is saving the cost of compliance with
SEC registration requirements. It should be noted, however, that such savings represent a
small return on the substantial investment involved in most going private transactions.
Moreover, any savings must be balanced against the corporation's loss of the protection from
insider abuse provided by the securities laws. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 1032-33; Yale
Note, supra note 1, at 906-08.
24 In what has become a widely quoted speech, former SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer,
Jr. severely attacked the "fad of 'going private,'" noting:
What is happening is, in my estimation, serious, unfair, and sometimes disgraceful,
a perversion of the whole process of public financing, and a course that inevitably
is going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile to American corpo-
rate mores and the securities markets than he already is.
Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private" A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, Law
Advisory Council Lecture at the Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 20, 1974), reprinted in [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010, at 84,695 [hereinafter cited as
Sommer Address]. Commissioner Sommer followed up this attack in a later speech, urging
expansion of rule 10b-5 to reach this type of activity. See Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
Further Thoughts on "Going Private," Second Annual Securities Seminar of the Detroit
Institute for Continuing Legal Education (Mar. 14, 1975), reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 294, at D-1 (Mar. 19, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Second Sommer Address].
1 See, e.g., Borden, 'Going Private' Fad: Infatuation Unlikely to Disappear Soon, 174
N.Y.L.J. 114, Dec. 15, 1975, at 40, col. 4. See also notes 68, 71 infra.
" See Second Sommer Address, supra note 24, at D-3. See also notes 28-37 and accompa-
nying text infra.
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transactions on the ground that these transactions, even if in accord
with applicable state statutes, violated the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws.27 These decisions mark the most expan-
sive readings of the antifraud provisions to date. The purpose of this
Note is twofold: First, to determine whether the expansion of the
federal securities laws in this area is justified; and second, to exam-
ine the remedies available under state law to shareholders who have
been frozen out in a going private transaction. Since the existence
of effective state law remedies has a direct bearing on whether fed-
eral intervention is justified in the area of going private, this Note
will first present an overview of the state law remedies made avail-
able by those few courts which have considered the problem.
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES UNDER STATE LAW
Most states provide by statute that shareholders who dissent
from fundamental corporate transactions such as mergers have a
right to have the corporation purchase their shares at their ap-
praised value.2" While this remedy works reasonably well in situa-
tions wherein the shareholder has the option of continuing his in-
vestment in the merged enterprise or demanding appraisal,2 there
are several reasons why an appraisal proceeding may provide inade-
quate protection for a shareholder's investments in freeze-out situa-
tions. It has been argued, for example, that appraisal will often give
the shareholder less than his stock is worth to him, that only a
shareholder should have the right to decide when his stock should
be sold, and that a shareholder may well have other ties to the
corporation which should not be undermined by the elimination of
his stock interest.3 0 Moreover, forced appraisal may result in unde-
r Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), remanded for determination
of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
2 Eg., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1975). See generally W. CARY, CASES AND MATRuALS ON CORPORATIONS 1229-32 (4th ed.
1970); F. O'NAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.27 (1975); Manning, The
Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
" Even if the minority shareholder is allowed to continue his investment, he may meet
with substantial difficulties. See Manning, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy: An Essay
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
30 See generally Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77 HIv. L. Rav. 1189, 1200-05 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Vorenberg]. Professor
Vorenberg argues that while the minority shareholder's interests are not absolute, "only
where there is a plausible business purpose of the corporation beyond the majority's desire
to enlarge their own stockholdings or to eliminate a minority stockholder should the minority
holder be required to choose between what is available to him as a result of the action
[Vol. 51:131
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sirable tax consequences for the frozen-out shareholder.3 1 Finally,
since the object of an appraisal proceeding is to give those share-
holders who dissent from a basic corporate transaction the oppor-
tunity to avoid the consequences of the transaction, rather than
undo it or to exert any control over its terms, the appraisal remedy
is ill suited to provide any measure of substantive fairness for those
shareholders unjustly frozen out. 2 In a typical going private case,
for example, the corporation's control group will often have far more
extensive information about the company's present finances and
future prospects than the minority shareholders, and thus may be
in a position to induce the appraisal-triggering device at a time
when the minority forced to seek appraisal can neither demonstrate,
nor perhaps even determine, that the corporation is worth more
than its past record and current share value suggests.
33
A threshold question to be answered by a shareholder faced
with a freeze-out device which triggers his appraisal rights is
whether existence of the appraisal remedy forecloses all other forms
proposed by the majority and the cash value of his shares." Id. at 1204. Thus, if the majority's
only purpose is a freeze-out, the stockholder should not be required to accept appraisal, but
should be free to seek injunctive relief. But see Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc.
988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952). In Blumenthal, a suit by minority stock-
holders to enjoin a sale of assets by the defendant to a subsidiary of the Hilton Hotels Corp.
was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The court stated that "a stockholder has
no constitutionally protected right to continue as a stockholder so long as the value of his
interest is compensable." Id. at 992, 115 N.Y.S.2d at 57. The Blumenthal court held that,
absent any allegations of fraud, an appraisal proceeding will protect the full value of the
shareholder's interest and the court will not grant injunctive relief even where the purpose of
the majority is to freeze-out minority interests.
11 See Vorenberg, supra note 30, at 1203-04, where the author observes that a stockholder
who is forced to take cash for his shares may have capital gains tax payable on any apprecia-
tion in the value of his shares. This consequence might have been avoided had there been a
merger, by giving the shareholder stock in the reorganized enterprise. This situation is un-
likely to occur in most going private transactions, however, since these usually take place
when the stock is selling at depressed prices, and thus capital gains are unlikely. See Brudney,
supra note 1, at 1024 n.20.
2 See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 297, 304-07 (1974).
m See Vorenberg, supra note 30, at 1201-03. But see Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37
N.Y.2d 585, 338 N.E.2d 614, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1975), where shareholders who had dissented
from a proposed merger sought appraisal of their shares. The New York Court of Appeals
noted that the three factors usually considered in an appraisal are net asset value, market
value, and investment value. The court stated that it did not necessarily follow that all three
should influence the result of the appraisal in every proceeding. After examining the facts
before it, the court held that the only proper measure of true value in Endicott Johnson was
the investment value, and that the market value, which was only slightly more than half of
the investment value, should be ignored altogether. The flexible approach utilized by the
court in this case goes a good distance towards meeting at least some of the arguments against
the appraisal remedy.
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of relief. Although some appraisal statutes indicate that the remedy
is intended to be exclusive," many are silent on the subject,:" and
some provide express exceptions to the remedy's exclusiveness." It
has been noted that if the appraisal remedy were held to be exclu-
sive in freeze-out situations, the result would be analogous to an
eminent domain proceeding whereby the majority interests could,
simply by their approval of an appraisal-triggering device, impose
a forced liquidation on the minority. 7
Although the older decisions based on state law indicate some
unwillingness to extend other legal and equitable remedies to share-
holders with appraisal rights,' recent freeze-out cases evidence a
more liberal attitude with respect to these remedies. For example,
in Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Inc. 3 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit granted equitable relief in the form of an injunction to share-
holders who were the intended victims of such a freeze-out.
At issue in Bryan was whether a Georgia merger statute'" that
granted appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders could properly
be used solely for the purpose of freezing out the minority sharehold-
ers. The plaintiff, Bryan, had owned 15 percent of the shares of
Brock & Blevins, a closely held Georgia corporation. Bryan had been
a vice president of the company, but had resigned that position
because of management problems. After his resignation, the re-
maining shareholders sought to acquire all Bryan's shares for them-
selves. After unsuccessful cash offers, the majority group attempted
to utilize a freeze-out merger with a shell intermediary corporation
to eliminate Bryan's interests in Brock & Blevins. Bryan petitioned
the federal district court for an injunction preventing the proposed
merger, alleging that it violated both the federal securities laws and
the conditions of good faith and fair dealing which were implicit in
the Georgia merger statute.4 The district court granted the injunc-
31 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 4123 (West 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-373(f) (West
1960).
5 E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-5-7 (Bums 1972).
11 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
113(b) (1975).
11 Vorenberg, supra note 30, at 1191. A similar analogy was utilized by the court in
Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA 000268, slip op. at 2, 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975), discussed
in notes 56-58 and accompanying text infra.
3' See, e.g., Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); Blu-
menthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1952); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) (en banc).
31 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), affg 343 F.Supp. 1062 (N.D.
Ga. 1972).
10 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1001 (1970).
1 343 F. Supp. at 1063-66; 490 F.2d at 571.
[Vol. 51:131
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tion, holding, inter alia, that the merger scheme violated section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.42
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide
whether the merger violated the federal securities laws, and instead
affirmed the decision solely on the basis of the pendent state claim.13
The court held that absent a valid business purpose, mergers which
have the effect of freezing out minority shareholders breach the
majority's fiduciary duty to the minority, and should be enjoined
pursuant to general principles of state corporation law." In its opin-
ion the Bryan court noted that in situations where the majority
interests could not legally eliminate the minority shareholders di-
rectly, simple equity required that they not be allowed to do so
indirectly by such means as a "sham" merger transaction." Al-
though Bryan involved a closely held corporation, and hence was
not a going private case, the Bryan court's willingness to grant in-
junctive relief where majority shareholders breach their fiduciary
duties by freezing out the minority shareholders without a business
purpose was quickly adopted by other courts and subsequently ap-
plied to publicly held corporations.
2 343 F. Supp. at 1070. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). The district court found that "[tihe
proposed merger itself was a course of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
Bryan, in connection with the sale of his stock." 343 F. Supp. at 1070.
' 490 F.2d at 571.
" Id. The court-of appeals apparently adopted the plaintiff's contention that the valid
business purpose requirement was implicit in the Georgia merger statute. The court indicated
that it took a dim view of such transactions:
We think that the case so clearly establishes the right of the plaintiff to the relief
granted by the trial court under general principles of corporation law, which we
have discussed above, that we permit a determination as to whether the trial
court correctly related the misuse of the Georgia statute to the Securities Exchange
law, and approve the decision on the basis of general equity and state law grounds.
Id.
,5 Id. at 570-71. The court noted that a majority shareholder
cannot violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly through the corporation what
he could not do directly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and
to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms
that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical require-
ments.
Id. at 570, quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939). The status of majority share-
holders as fiduciaries has long been established. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250
U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919).
11 E.g., Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974)(mem.), wherein a
federal district court, relying principally on Bryan, enjoined a going private cash merger as
both a violation of rule 10b-5 and a breach of the majority's fiduciary duties under state law.
The merger plan, which was developed for the purpose of eliminating public ownership, called
for the use of a shell intermediary. The court held that going private was not, in and of itself,
a valid business purpose which would justify eliminating minority interests. Id. at 756-57. The
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One question unanswered by the Bryan decision is just what
constitutes a business purpose properly sufficient to justify freezing
out minority shareholders." While subsequent cases which have
found a business purpose to exist have set forth a number of reasons
for this decision,4 it would appear from an analysis of those cases
case is discussed in Fraidin, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation-1974, 31 Bus.
LAw. 653, 665 (1976); Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44
FORDHAM L. REv. 796, 804-05 (1976). In Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36,
342 A.2d 566 (Ch. 1975), a New Jersey court enjoined a going private freeze-out merger on
the ground that the majority had breached its fiduciary duty to the minority by its failure to
deal fairly with them. Id. at 48-50, 342 A.2d at 573-74. The adequacy of the price offered the
minority for their shares was a principal consideration in Berkowitz since New Jersey law
provides that where a corporation's stockholders are to be paid in cash, the stockholder does
not have the right of appraisal. Id. at 44, 343 A.2d at 571, citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-
l(1)(a) (West Supp. 1976). While the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
business purpose requirement of Bryan was also law in New Jersey, it did indicate that it
would favor such a requirement. 135 N.J. Super. at 48, 342 A.2d at 573.
,1 The problem of what constitutes a proper business purpose for going private has been
given much attention by commentators. See, e.g., Borden, supra note 1, at 1022-23; Greene,
supra note 8, at 489-91; Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC.
REG. L.J. 33 (1975).
" In Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974),
afJ'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975), for example, the defendant corporation (DLJ) had grad-
ually acquired 57% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, Meridian, in which plaintiff
was a minority shareholder. Eventually, DUJ decided to take over sole ownership of Meridian.
To accomplish this, DLJ transferred its Meridian shares to its wholly owned subsidiary,
DLJRE, which then proposed to merge Meridian with a new corporation created by DLJRE,
with the minority interests to receive cash for their Meridian shares. Plaintiff Grimes, a
minority shareholder of Meridian, then brought suit both individually and derivatively on
behalf of Meridian to enjoin the merger, alleging, inter alia, that the proposed merger entailed
a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority in violation of state corporation laws
in that the merger had no purpose other than to freeze-out the minority interests. The district
court refused to enjoin the merger, finding three valid business reasons for it: (1) the merger
was a "logical proposition" since Meridian and DLJRE were engaged in similar business
activities; (2) the existence of a public minority in Meridian threatened conflict of interest
claims by shareholders of DLJ or Meridian in connection with any transactions between the
two; and (3) the merger promised to result in savings of $300,000 per year in the daily
operation of the corporations. Id. at 1402. Accord, Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292,
380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
In Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167,
383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976), the court refused to enjoin a short-form
merger which was to be the final step in the return of Libby, McNeil & Libby (Libby), a
Maine food processing corporation whose shares had previously traded on the New York Stock
Exchange, to private ownership. To effect the going private transaction, Nestle Alimentana,
S.A., which held 61% of Libby's shares through its wholly owned subsidiary, UFS, caused
UFS to tender for the remaining shares held by the public. The tender offer statement
disclosed that if more than 90% of the Libby common stock were acquired, Libby would be
merged into UFS by means of a short-form merger and the nontendering minority would
receive cash for their shares. The tender offer was successful, resulting in the acquisition of
91% of the outstanding Libby shares by UFS. Before the merger could take place, however,
one of the minority shareholders of Libby sought an injunction to prevent the merger. The
court applied the business purpose test, but refused to grant the injunction, finding nine
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that in each of them the freeze-out transaction represented what
was to be the final step in combining two ongoing and previously
unrelated businesses.49 It should be noted that none of the courts
were prepared to hold that the frozen-out shareholder's only proper
relief was through an appraisal proceeding, even though appraisal
was available. Moreover, each court indicated that in a proper case,
injunctive relief would be available."
A theory entirely different from breach of fiduciary duty by the
majority was utilized to support the grant of injunctive relief in
People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc.5 1 There, the court utilized the anti-
fraud provisions of New York State's blue sky laws',2 to grant a
temporary injunction sought by the state attorney general against
a going private freeze-out merger. The court found that the absence
of scienter, one of the classical elements of common law fraud, was
not a defense to the action5 3 since the statute affords the attorney
general broad powers to investigate securities transactions and to
separate business reasons for the merger, including greater economy from centralization,
avoidance of duplication, diversity of products, greater ease in financing, elimination of
conflicts of interest problems, and avoidance of the cost of being public. Id. at 182, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 483.
11 In each of the cases cited in note 48 supra, the contested mergers represented what
was to be the final step in a program of corporate amalgamation. In each, the corporation
which eventually assumed control of the target corporation had begun its program of acquisi-
tion as an unrelated concern, independent of the controlling interests of the acquired corpora-
tion. It is submitted that the real reason for the denial of injunctive relief in these cases is
that "the elimination of a remaining minority interest as the final step in the amalgamation
of two previously unrelated businesses is a proper purpose." Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a
Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEc. REG. L.J. 33, 61 (1975). It is still an open question
whether there is a legitimate corporate purpose sufficient to justify going private freeze-outs
where the only corporations involved are the target corporation and a shell corporation,
created by the target corporation's insiders.
11 See Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1402-03 (N.D.
Fla. 1974), afl'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975); Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal
Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 171-76, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476-79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1976); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 295, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957, 960 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
1' 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd per curiam, 50 App.
Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't 1975). The merger at issue in Concord was the same
one later enjoined by the Second Circuit in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir.), remanded for determination of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976), discussed in notes 76-90
and accompanying text infra.
52 N.Y. GEm. Bus. LAW §§ 352 to 359-h (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1976). The court noted
that § 352 empowers the New York Attorney General to conduct investigations into "fraudu-
lent practices" in securities transactions, and § 353 empowers him to bring an action to enjoin
such practices. 83 Misc. 2d at 123-24, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54.
83 Misc. at 124, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 554. It has long been the rule in New York that the
protection afforded by the state blue sky laws is more extensive than that afforded by a cause
of action in common law fraud. See, e.g., People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154
N.E. 655 (1926).
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enjoin them where necessary to facilitate his inquiries." Although
the substantive questions regarding legality of the merger were not
at issue in the case, the court nevertheless expressed its distaste for
the type of transaction involved." Interestingly, Concord may be the
first time a court has applied state blue sky laws to a going private
transaction. Although Concord was instituted by the attorney gen-
eral and was not a minority shareholder's action, it is submitted
that it is indicative of judicial willingness to intervene in freeze-out
situations.
While injunctive relief has been the remedy most often sought
in going private cases by minority shareholders not content with
appraisal, it is not necessarily the only relief available. In Jutkowitz
v. Bourns,"6 a California case, the plaintiff was a minority share-
holder in Bourns, Inc., a corporation controlled by the Bourns fam-
ily. When the Bourns family sought to return the corporation en-
tirely to its own control by means of a freeze-out merger with a shell
intermediary, the plaintiff sued to enjoin the transaction, alleging
that the terms were unfair and the merger lacked a business pur-
pose. The court dismissed the claims as to the unfair price, finding
that appraisal was a sufficient remedy for these complaints. More
importantly, the court implied that the plaintiff had a right to re-
tain his interest in the corporation if he so wished, and that a corpo-
ration seeking to go private must make some provision for those
minority shareholders who wish to continue their investment. 5 To
effectuate this principle, the Jutkowitz court created a novel rem-
edy: rather than enjoin the merger outright, the court conditioned
it on the surviving corporation placing a sufficient number of shares
83 Misc. 2d at 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
The court observed:
What is disquietingly evident here is the fact that a group of insiders who are
directing the reacquisition program, even controlling the appraisal of the stock are
the very ones who made the company public originally, and will be the surviving
shareholders in the proposed privately-held enterprise. Adding to the odium of the
scheme is that fact that no real corporate purpose has been demonstrated and that
the credit of a now public corporation will be used to finance a merger for the benefit
of a private group.
Id.
5 No. CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975), discussed in TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS,
supra note 5, at 21-24.
"' No. CA 000268, slip op. at 4. The court noted:
Money now may well satisfy some or most minority shareholders, but others may
have differing investment goals, tax problems, a belief in the ability of Bourns'
management to make them rich, or even a sentimental attachment to the stock
which leads them to have a different judgment as to the desirability of selling out.
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in escrow to cover the demands of those shareholders who desired
to continue their investment. Those shareholders who chose not to
retain their shares were left with the choice of either accepting the
cash offer or exercising their appraisal rights."'
Jutkowitz and the other cases discussed herein illustrate the
potential availability of state remedies other than appraisal, and
indicate that state laws are flexible enough to provide injunctive or
other relief in proper cases. By imposing a business purpose require-
ment on going private transactions, courts applying state law can
accomplish a balancing of interests between the minority and ma-
jority shareholders. While the state cases are few, and it may not
be assumed that all states have adequate remedies to protect vic-
tims of improper going private transactions, neither should the as-
sumption be made that appraisal is the sole remedy available under
state law and that state law protections are necessarily inadequate.
It is in the light of the trend towards expansion of state law remedies
that the case for extension of the federal securities laws into this
area must be reviewed.
FEDERAL REMEDIES
Those going private cases which have been brought in federal
courts have all alleged violations of either the antifraud provisions
of section 10(b)59 or the proxy rules of section 14(e)60 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. Until recently, it was generally believed
that claims arising under those sections and based upon corporate
transactions such as mergers could be sustained only where it could
be shown that there had been inadequate disclosure." In the wake
" For a discussion of Jutkowitz, see Note, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose
Test for Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.,
64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184, 1203-05 (1976). It has been argued that the decision in Jutkowitz gives
the minority interests too much control and substitutes a rule of "minority tyranny" for the
"private condemnation" argument advanced by the Jutkowitz plaintiffs. See TAKEOVERS AND
TAKEours, supra note 5, at 25. For a discussion of the possible effects of recent changes in
the California corporation laws on the Jutkowitz holding, see Small, Corporate Combinations
Under the New California General Corporation Law, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1190, 1218 n.137
(1976).
51 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). See, e.g., Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah
1974)(mem.); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), remanded for determination of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
61 The leading case in this area was Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972),
wherein the Second Circuit concluded that "where it appears from the record that full and
fair disclosure was made . . . we think that a Rule 10b-5 action for injunctive relief must
fail." Id. at 720 n.17. Hence, the only remedy for the plaintiff who alleged unfairness in the
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of the growing trend towards going private, however, more expan-
sive readings of the federal securities laws were urged so that the
interests of the investing public might be better protected. 2 Former
SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer framed the problem as follows:
"Going private" presents somewhat directly and dramatically the
problems which are at the cutting edge in the development of
federal securities law. To what extent should the expansion of
federal securities law be fostered? Should the expansion of its con-
cepts be limited to areas in which state corporation law is not
operative? Should it be confined simply to disclosure or should the
powers accorded the Commission be read to sanction extension
into more substantive rule-making? Where state law provides in-
adequate protection for shareholders, particularly minority share-
holders, should federal law be interpreted broadly to supply safe-
guards lacking in state law? 3
It is noteworthy that one of the cornerstones in the argument
made by Commissioner Sommer 4 and others 5 in favor of federal
regulation of going private transactions is the presumed lack of
adequate state law remedies. This presumption is apparently based
on the notion that the sole state law remedy available to sharehold-
ers in freeze-out situations is appraisal.66 While this may more
nearly have been the case at the time this assumption was made,
the analysis made herein of recent court decisions construing state
law shows that state courts are not necessarily bound by the ap-
terms of the merger agreement set by a controlling stockholder was in state court. Popkin
was generally followed by the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.,
398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), remanded for determination
of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp.
754 (D. Utah 1974)(mem.); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972),
aff'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). An excellent
discussion of the Popkin case and its progeny is provided in Borden, supra note 1, at 1032-
36.
,2 See Sommer Address, supra note 24; Second Sommer Address, supra note 24. Former
SEC Commissioner Sommer is perhaps the chief protagonist of federal intervention in going
private transactions.
"s Second Sommer Address, supra note 24, at D-3.
" See id.
See, e.g., Note, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going Private:
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CAuF. L. REv. 1184,
1197-99 (1976).
" See Sommer Address, supra note 24, at 84,696. See also Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.,
398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1277, remanded for determination of
mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976), wherein the district court stated that "[wihere a merger is
to be accomplished in accordance with statutory proceedings, as here, appraisal is the only
remedy available to dissenting shareholders." Id. at 739 (footnotes omitted).
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praisal remedy. 7 In fact, in view of the potentially wide range of
relief against corporations available under state law, state courts
would appear to be the forum better suited to provide these reme-
dies.18
It seems ironic that when the federal courts finally did inter-
vene in going-private transactions, they adopted a state law theory
of liability, viz., breach of fiduciary duty, and equated it with fraud
under rule 10b-569 in order to justify federal jurisdiction. If the sym-
pathetic outlook toward minority shareholders and the innovative
approach to remedies shown in some recent state court decisions0
continue, it would seem more economical and logical to leave these
theories of liability and remedies to state courts.7'
Without the benefit of such hindsight, however, Commissioner
Sommer urged that a liberal reading be given the securities laws
both to assure the SEC the power to impose substantive require-
ments on corporations seeking to go private, and to provide federal
courts a broader scope of review over such transactions. 72 In an effort
17 See notes 28-58 and accompanying text supra. See generally 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURI-
TIES LAW § 4.7(B), at 400.2 (1975 Supp.).
" As a matter of policy, the Supreme Court has directed that ordinarily, federal courts
should leave regulation of internal corporate activity to the states:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corpo-
rate directors on the understanding that except where federal law expressly requires
certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will gov-
ern the internal affairs of the corporation.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). Similar sentiments are expressed in Green v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1304 (2d Cir.) (Moore, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54
(1976)(No. 75-1753). See note 71 infra.
1' Rule 10b-5, which has perhaps become the single most important element in the SEC's
fraud prevention scheme, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of a
national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
'o See notes 39-58 and accompanying text supra.
" Since corporations are creations of the state, it is logical to allow the state to provide
a comprehensive scheme for regulating corporate activities. If the states do, in fact, provide
effective regulation, it seems unnecessary and wasteful to equate state law theories with
federal theories to create still more overlapping regulatory power. See note 68 supra.
72 Second Sommer Address, supra note 24, at D-3.
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to provide more substance-oriented regulation, the SEC proposed
two alternative rules directly aimed at the practice of going pri-
vate.7" Although these rules initially generated some favorable com-
ments from investors, the reaction of the organized bar has been
generally negative,74 and difficult questions have been raised regard-
ing both the wisdom of intervention by the SEC in the internal
affairs of corporations and the Commission's authority to so inter-
vene. 75 Probably as a result of such criticism, the proposals have
apparently been abandoned.
The development of new SEC rules regarding going private
transactions may have become irrelevant, however, in view of two
recent holdings by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.7 and Green v. Santa Fe Industries,
Inc.,77 the Second Circuit expanded the scope of rule 10b-5 to in-
clude regulation of these transactions, holding that mergers effec-
tuated by corporations as part of attempts to go private are in viola-
13 Proposed Rules 13e-3A, 13e-3B, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,231 (Feb. 6, 1975),
as appearing in 2 FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 23,704-05. Proposed rule 13e-3A applies a
"fairness approach" to going private transactions; proposed rule 13e-3B is a codified version
of the "business purpose" test, although it does not explain what standards a business pur-
pose would have to meet to satisfy its requirements. See Notice of Public Fact-Finding
Investigation and Rulemaking Proceeding in the Matter of "Going Private" Transactions by
Public Companies and Their Affiliates, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,231 (Feb. 6, 1975),
as appearing in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,104. For a
discussion of what constitutes a "proper business purpose," see Borden, supra note 1, at 1022-
23; Greene, supra note 8, at 506-08; Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose
Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33 (1975). The proposed rules are discussed in Greene, supra note
8, at 506-08.
11 A cross section of the response to the proposed regulations is presented in SEC. REG.
L. REP. (BNA) No. 318, at A-1 (Sept. 10, 1975).
"3 The American Bar Association's opinion letter on the proposed rules concludes:
[Tihe Commission should not attempt to meet "going private" problems by pro-
mulgating broad new substantive rules. The difficulty in identifying those circum-
stances in which unfairness becomes fraud alone suggests that the effort be aban-
doned. Equally important, detailed substantive rules would begin Federal regula-
tion of internal corporate affairs of a type which should occur, if at all, only as a
result of Congressional investigation and explicit statutory authority.
Letter from the American Bar Association, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities
of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secre-
tary, SEC, in response to SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,231 (July 18, 1975) reprinted in
TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS, supra note 5, at 113.
71 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), remanded for deter-
mination of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976). The proposed merger considered in Marshel was
previously temporarily enjoined by a New York State court in People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc.,
83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd per curiam, 50 App. Div. 2d
787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't 1975), discussed in notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
71 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S.
Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
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tion of rule 10b-5 absent a valid business purpose for the transac-
tion.
Marshel, which was decided first, presented the more compel-
ling facts to justify federal intervention. Prior to 1968, Concord Fab-
rics was a closely held corporation owned entirely by the Weinstein
family. In that year, the company offered for sale to the public
300,000 of its shares at a price of $15 per share. During the following
year, the Weinsteins sold an additional 200,000 shares to the public
at $20 per share. The stock rose in price for a time, eventually
reaching a high of $25, but by the end of 1974 had plunged in value
to only $1 per share. Corporate earnings also fluctuated considera-
bly, reaching record highs in fiscal 1968-1969, but suffering severe
losses in fiscal 1971-1972. From that time until the merger, however,
the corporation met with moderate success. The Weinsteins, who
still retained 68 percent ownership of Concord, then decided to re-
turn the corporation to their exclusive control. 78
To accomplish their objective and regain complete control of
Concord, the Weinsteins formed a new corporation, AFW Fabric
Corp., to which they transferred all their Concord shares in return
for all of AFW's stock. A merger between AFW and Concord was
then proposed, under the terms of which the public shareholders of
Concord were to receive $3 in cash for each share of Concord stock.7
The Weinsteins arrived at the $3 per share figure based on an ap-
praisal conducted by an investment banker of questionable
independence." The shareholders were to be paid out of the assets
of Concord.' The proxy statement issued in conjunction with the
shareholders' meeting at which the merger decision was to be made
stated straightforwardly that the purpose of the merger was to make
Concord a private company again so that the Weinsteins could de-
termine all company policies by themselves without any public
scrutiny. 2
71 533 F.2d at 1278-79.
" Id. at 1279.
The appraiser was the son of one of Concord's directors. Although this fact was not
stated in the Second Circuit's opinion, it had been brought out in related litigation. See
People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 121, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), aff'd per curiam, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't 1975).
11 The share repurchase was to be financed through bank loans to AFW Corp., which
would become the obligations of Concord after the merger. 533 F.2d at 1279. The court found
this to be important since it represented an attempt by the majority stockholders to use
corporate funds for personal benefit. Id. at 1282. It has been argued, however, that it is
immaterial whether the money used by the corporation to finance going private is provided
by the majority shareholders or by the corporation since this factor would make no difference
to the minority. See Brodsky, Going Private (III), 175 N.Y.L.J. 67, April 7, 1976, at 2, col. 2.
11 The court quoted the recital of purpose included in the proxy statement:
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The minority shareholders of Concord sued in federal district
court to enjoin the merger as violative of both state law and the
federal securities laws on the ground that the merger constituted a
scheme to defraud the plaintiffs into selling their Concord shares for
inadequate consideration.13 The district court rejected the federal
claim, relying primarily on Popkin v. Bishop84 for the proposition
that if there has been full disclosure in connection with such corpo-
rate transactions, as there had been in the instant case, there is no
remedy available under the federal securities laws.' The court
noted that the sole remedy available in situations of this type was
the exercise of appraisal rights under state law.8
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
enjoined the merger.' The court declared that
when controlling stockholders and directors of a publicly-held cor-
poration cause it to expend corporate funds to force elimination of
minority stockholders' equity participation for reasons not benefit-
ing the corporation but rather serving only the interests of the
controlling stockholders such conduct will be enjoined pursuant to
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 .... "
The court stated that the 10b-5 remedy exists regardless of the
presence or absence of state remedies, and therefore made no find-
ing as to whether the merger was valid under state law." A concur-
ring opinion found it difficult to reconcile the majority's holding
with the Popkin case, however, and maintained instead that the
injunction should be granted because the proposed merger consti-
tuted a breach of fiduciary duty under state law."
The purpose of the proposed merger of AFW into the Company [Concordl is to
return the Company to the status of a privately-held corporation owned by the
Weinstein family. Upon consummation of the merger, the Weinsteins will be the
sole stockholders and directors of the Company, and will thus be able to determine
all policies of the Company, such as salaries for themselves and others, dividends
and business activities, without public scrutiny and solely with regard to their own
interests.
533 F.2d at 1279.
398 F. Supp. at 739.
-1 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed in note 61 supra.
' 398 F. Supp. at 737-39.
Id. at 739.
533 F.2d at 1278. On the appraisal question, the Second Circuit noted simply that
"[wie do not regard the existence of the state appraisal remedy as negating the appellants'
rights under federal law." Id. at 1281.
- Id.
" Id. at 1280-81.
Id. at 1282 (Smith, J., concurring). Judge Smith observed that the "full, even brazen"
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Less than a week after Marshel was decided, the Second Circuit
utilized its decision in that case as a stepping stone to perhaps the
most expansive reading of rule 10b-5 to date. In Green v. Santa Fe
Industries, Inc.,99 the court held that a freeze-out of minority share-
holders by a majority attempting to go private through the use of a
short-form merger is a violation of rule 10b-5 absent a proper busi-
ness purpose.92 This is a rather remarkable holding in view of the
fact that a major purpose of short-form merger statutes, enacted in
38 states,93 is to enable a parent company holding the specified
number of shares to freeze-out the minority stockholders of a corpo-
ration without their approval.94
In Green, the defendant, Santa Fe Industries Corp., owned all
the capital stock of Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc. [Resources],
which in turn owned approximately 95 percent of the voting shares
of Kirby Lumber Corporation, a Delaware corporation.9" Pursuant
to a merger plan, Resources caused Forest Products, Inc. [FPI] to
incorporate in Delaware, and then transferred its Kirby shares to
FPI in return for all of FPI's shares. Shortly thereafter, FPI's board
of directors, which was identical to the board of Resources, adopted
a resolution to merge FPI and Kirby. Under the terms of the merger,
the minority shareholders of Kirby were to receive $150 cash per
share for their stock. 96
The plaintiff, a minority shareholder of Kirby, brought suit in
disclosure in the case cast doubt on the desirability of a "full disclosure" bar in all situations.
He would have enjoined the merger under state law fiduciary duty concepts in a fashion
similar to that used by the Fifth Circuit in the Bryan case. Id. For a discussion of Bryan, see
notes 39-46 and accompanying text supra.
" 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted. 97 S.
Ct. 54 (1976).
92 533 F.2d at 1291.
11 The 38 states which have short-form merger statutes, along with the percentages of
the subsidiary's stock which must be owned by the parent to qualify under each statute, were
enumerated by Judge Moore in his dissenting opinion. 533 F.2d at 1299 n.1 (Moore, J.,
dissenting). Since Green was decided, the number of states allowing such mergers has in-
creased by at least one, as a result of California's new General Corporation Law, which allows
such mergers, at least where the subsidiary is being merged into the parent, if the parent owns
90% of the stock in the subsidiary. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1110(b) (West Supp. 1976) (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1977). The new provision is discussed in Small, Corporate Combinations Under
the New California General Corporation Law, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1190, 1208, 1217-18 (1976).
" See TAKEOVERS AND TAEOuTs, supra note 5, at 24. In his dissent in Green, Judge Moore
characterized the short-form merger statute as the right of the majority to expedite a merger
which is already assured by the parent's overwhelming majority ownership of the subsidiary.
533 F.2d at 1305 (Moore, J., dissenting).
92 The Delaware short-form merger statute can be utilized where the parent controls
more than 90% of the subsidiary's shares. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974).
11 533 F.2d at 1288.
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federal district court, alleging two separate violations of rule 10b-5.
He contended, first, that a merger consummated for the benefit of
the majority, and without any justifiable business purpose, is a
fraud on minbrity shareholders. The plaintiff also argued that the
compensation offered the plaintiffs for their shares was so grossly
inadequate as to constitute fraud in and of itself.9"
The district court rejected the shareholders' claims, finding the
merger to be in compliance with the Delaware Corporation Law
which does not require that a merger be effected for a business
reason.98 The court noted:
The primary objective of Rule 10b-5 is to impose a duty of disclo-
sure upon a corporation and its controlling persons. That objective
is to be achieved in conjunction with the state corporate law. This
Court does not regard Rule 10b-5 as an omnibus federal corpora-
tion law having such broad reach as to modify the notice require-
ments of the Delaware merger statute, or prevent Delaware, in its
legislative wisdom, from providing a means by which a majority
can exclude a minority from the corporation's future affairs, so
long as due process is satisfied, as it is here, by the appraisal
procedures.99
Interestingly, the district court found implicit support for its hold-
ing-that rule 10b-5 does not reach such a transaction-in the fact
that the SEC had apparently thought it necessary to propose spe-
cific new rules to regulate such conduct under section 13(e) of the
1934 Act.' 0 The court also rejected the claim of fraudulent under-
valuation, noting that appraisal is an adequate remedy where there
has been full disclosure and the dispute is simply as to the fair
value of the minority shares.'0 '
The Second Circuit reversed, °0 holding that "a complaint al-
leges a claim under Rule 10b-5 when it charges, in connection with
a Delaware short-form merger, that the majority has committed a
breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders
by effecting the merger without any justifiable business purpose.' '0 3
17 Id. at 1285. The $150 offered for each minority share was based upon the opinion of
an independent investment banker which had concluded that if the shares had been trading
freely on the open market, they would have brought about $125 per share. The plaintiffs
contended that the appraisal value should have been at least $772 per share, based upon the
value of the assets owned by Kirby. Id. at 1288.
391 F. Supp. at 852-53.
Id. at 853 (citation omitted).
Id. at 854-55.
I" Id. at 853-54. See note 97 supra.




The opinion found that such a breach of fiduciary duty was equiva-
lent to fraud under subdivisions (1) and (3) of rule 10b-5, and that
the presence or absence of full disclosure, dealt with in subdivision
(2) of the rule, was inapplicable in the case at bar.1"" Relying on
Popkin v. Bishop10 5 for the proposition that "[w]here Rule 10b-5
properly extends, it will be applied regardless of any cause of action
that may exist under state law,"'' 6 the court also held that compli-
ance with applicable state laws in effectuating the merger was not
a defense.0 7
In a vehement dissent, Judge Moore stated that the effect of the
decision would be "to override and nullify not only the corporate
laws of Delaware with respect to short-form corporate mergers, but
also, in effect, comparable laws in an additional thirty-seven
states."'"" Judge Moore argued that the Green holding was an un-
warranted extension of federal securities laws into internal corpo-
o, Id. at 1286-87. The court noted that while subdivision 2 of the rule deals exclusively
with misrepresentation and nondisclosure, there are two other subdivisions of the rule which
are not so limited. The majority adopted a broad reading of the federal securities laws,
declaring:
As with other laws Rule lOb-5 must be interpreted and applied so as to accomplish
the purpose for which it was intended. That this requires a generous reading is too
obvious for comment. Since the time to which the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary the human animal has been full of cunning and guile. Many of the
schemes and artifices have been so sophisticated as almost to defy belief. But the
ordinary run of those willing and able to take unfair advantage of others are mere
apprentices in the art when compared with the manipulations thought up by those
connected in one way or another with transactions in securities.
Id. at 1287. This preface to the court's holding drew sharp criticism from Judge Moore
because of what he characterized as the suggestive words used to characterize the transaction.
Id. at 1299-1300 (Moore, J., dissenting). Later, in Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal
Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976),
Justice Greenfield also cited with disapproval this use of language by the court in Green,
noting that:
Skill in choosing appropriate semantic labels may foreshadow the outcome. The
claim of "freeze-out" by a predatory majority using their power as insiders to mulct
corporate funds and to overreach in order to unjustly enrich themselves tends to
lead a sympathetic court to look indulgently upon extra-statutory remedies.
Id. at 175, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79 (footnote omitted).
1- 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed in note 61 supra.
1 533 F.2d at 1286, quoting Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). The concep-
tual difficulty presented by this statement, of course, is that the quotation from Popkin is
directed toward conduct which violated both federal and state law, whereas the transaction
in Green was specifically sanctioned by state law. Thus, the Green holding does not add a
federal remedy to those provided by state law, but rather has the effect of nullifying state
laws. This problem is discussed in Brodsky, State Going-Private Laws-Dead or Alive?. 175
N.Y.L.J. 39, Feb. 27, 1976, at 14, col. 2.
"o 533 F.2d at 1286.
Id. at 1299 (Moore, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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rate affairs, an area traditionally reserved to the states.'"9 The dis-
sent stated that "[u]nder the law, breach of fiduciary duty and
commission of fraud are wholly different from one another,"'"', and
that "the essence of fraud is deliberate deception or concealment
which is calculated to deprive the victim of some right or to obtain,
by deceptive means, an impermissible advantage over him."11'
The Green decision is far more difficult to justify than is
Marshel. In Marshel, "the odium of the scheme,""1' 2 to quote the
New York court's characterization of the AFW-Concord merger, was
so great as to compel the Second Circuit to find a theory affording
relief to the shareholders. Indeed, the New York court had enjoined
the merger, a fact noted, although apparently not relied on by the
Second Circuit. "3 Green, on the other hand, involved a fairly typical
short-form merger. Not only was the transaction in issue in com-
plete technical compliance with applicable state law, but also the
facts were not compelling and there was apparently no fraud in-
volved, at least in the traditional sense. It has been suggested that
the court may have been influenced to intervene because of the wide
discrepancy in the valuation of the minority shares."' It is submit-
ted, however, that appraisal is an adequate remedy for undervalua-
tion, and certainly could have been utilized to ensure that the
frozen-out shareholders were adequately compensated for their in-
terest."'9 On the whole, the facts in Green do not seem to justify a
radical extension of rule 10b-5."11
I" Judge Moore argued: "Corporations are creatures of the State. They are created under
State law; they are empowered by State statute; and they are regulated by the legislative
mandates of the State which has sanctioned their existence." Id. at 1304. Compare id. with
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975), discussed in note 68 supra. Judge Moore charged that
the majority's use of the term "fraud" was no more than a smokescreen for its intervention
in internal corporate affairs, and accused it of "putting a torch to the teachings of Erie. "533
F.2d at 1307.
533 F.2d at 1304.
Id. at 1301 (footnote omitted). Judge Moore's requirements of calculated deception
or concealment appear to be in line with the Supreme Court's interpretation of rule lOb-5
handed down a short time later in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). For a
discussion of the Hochfelder case, see notes 127-30 and accompanying text infra.
"1 People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 554 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd per curiam, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't 1975),
discussed in notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
533 F.2d at 1280 n.3.
"' See TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS, supra note 5, at 53. The court itself noted specifically
that it was not holding that a claim of substantial undervaluation alone would support a lOb-
5 claim. 533 F.2d at 1291. However, the fact that the court listed "additional elements" would
seem to indicate that the undervaluation factor formed part of the basis for its decision.
"I See F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.27 (1975); note 33 and
accompanying text supra.
"' One commentator has commented on the surprise Green generated by noting:
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The decisions rendered by the Second Circuit in both Marshel
and Green do not appear consistent with the recent holdings by the
Supreme Court in the securities area. The trend of these decisions
seems to lie in the direction of curbing further expansions of the
federal securities laws and limiting federal regulation of corporate
activity. Both Marshel and Green relied in large part on the Su-
preme Court's direction in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life and Casualty Co. "7 that "Section 10(b) must be read flexibly,
not technically or restrictively."' In spite of that language, how-
ever, decisions by the Court subsequent to Bankers Life have evi-
denced considerable caution in expanding the federal remedies
available against corporations. During the past two years the Court
has handed down three major decisions concerning rule 10b-5 which
show a general trend toward constricting the scope of remedies
available under the rule.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Inc."' the Court
considered whether potential purchasers of stock should be granted
standing to maintain an action under rule 10b-5. The Court held
that the Birnbaum rule, limiting the class of plaintiffs in 10b-5
actions to actual purchasers and sellers,'2 0 was well founded both by
virtue of longstanding judicial and legislative acceptance and by
policy considerations, and should not be expanded or discarded ab-
sent the most compelling circumstances, which were not present in
that case.'2 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not expressly provide for
civil remedies, and further that there exists no legislative history
indicating that Congress had even considered the problem of civil
[Ilt is fair to say that before Green, the vast majority of corporate lawyers would
have concluded that the short-form merger as accomplished in Green was proper,
that there was no violation of Rule 10b-5 and that the shareholders' remedy was
either to accept cash offered by the company or to be appraised out.
Brodsky, State Going-Private Laws-Dead or Alive?, 175 N.Y.L.J. 39, Feb. 27, 1976, at 14,
col. 3. A fine capsule history of the Second Circuit's decisions in lOb-5 cases leading up to
and including Green and Marshel is provided in Greene, supra note 8, at 497-99 n.37.
' 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
"' Id. at 12. This direction was quoted in both the opinion and the concurrence in Green.
533 F.2d at 1290, 1296-97. It is noteworthy that Bankers Life was authored by Justice Douglas,
himself a former SEC Commissioner, and hence more likely to indulge broad interpretation
of the federal securities laws. The fact that Justice Douglas is no longer on the Court may
perhaps indicate that rule 10b-5 will henceforth be interpreted more narrowly.
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
,, See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952).
"1 421 U.S. at 755.
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remedies prior to passage of the Act.'22 Characterizing private ac-
tions under rule 10b-5 as "a judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn,"'' 23 the Court reaffirmed the
Birnbaum limitations, reversing the circuit court's decision' 2' and
halting expansion of rule 10b-5, at least on that front.
Perhaps even more indicative of the current thought of at least
some members of the Court with respect to further expansions of
rule 10b-5 is the concurring opinion in Blue Chip Stamps' 25 which
is directed more toward the basic policy questions involved. Justice
Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, after noting that
it was not feasible to extend rule 10b-5 to embrace offers to sell,
stated:
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enacting 10(b) and
in subsequently declining to extend it, took into account these and
similar considerations. The courts already have inferred a private
cause of action that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing
this, however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise language
of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This is exactly what respondents-
joined, surprisingly, by the SEC-sought in this case. If such a
far-reaching change is to be made, with unpredictable conse-
quences for the process of raising capital so necessary to our eco-
nomic well-being, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts. "'
A restrictive approach to rule 10b-5 was again adopted by the
Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 27 a highly significant decision
rendered shortly after Marshel and Green. In Hochfelder, the Court
held that a claim under rule 10b-5 cannot be maintained absent
some element of scienter and that section 10(b) does not impose
liability for negligent conduct alone.'28 It should be noted that this
position is somewhat parallel to that urged by Judge Moore in his
dissenting opinion in Green. ,29 Nonetheless, it remains an open
"I Id. at 729.
'2 Id. at 737.
M Manor Drug Stores, Inc. v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
'2 421 U.S. at 755 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell, who wrote a strong concurring
opinion in Manor Drug Stores, also wrote the majority opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976), and appears to be emerging as one of the Court's more dominant figures
in the area of securities and corporate law. For a discussion of Hochfelder, see notes 127-29
and accompanying text infra.
' 421 U.S. at 759-60 (footnote omitted).
" 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
' Id. at 214.
See 533 F.2d at 1301 (Moore, J., dissenting); notes 108-11 and accompanying text
supra. It is interesting to compare the Court's decision in Hochfelder with Judge Moore's
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question at this time whether Hochfelder will be construed as re-
quiring reversal of Green. 131 In both Marshel and Green, full disclo-
sure was conceded, and full disclosure seems somewhat inconsistent
with an intent to defraud.1 31 It would seem that a strong case could
be built, therefore, to the effect that going private cases can no
longer be reviewed by federal courts, at least in those instances
where there has been such full disclosure. Finally, while the
Hochfelder Court did not decide whether the scienter requirement
extends to suits seeking injunctive relief, it has since been held that
scienter is necessary in such cases as well. 131
In another recent securities decision, TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.,13  the Supreme Court constricted the definition of
materiality as used in the SEC's proxy rules. The change was in-
tended, at least in part, to prevent unduly burdensome regulation
of corporations, along with the concomitant chilling effect on corpo-
rate activity. This decision requires a shareholder alleging a mate-
rial omission in a proxy statement to show a "substantial likeli-
hood" that a shareholder would find the omitted material important
in deciding how to vote, rather than simply that the shareholder
might have found it important.134
Not only do Marshel and Green appear inconsistent with the
tenor of these recent Supreme Court decisions, but by extending the
limits on rule 10b-5 actions they create several problematic policy
questions. The American Bar Association Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities of the Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law noted a parallel problem concerning the SEC's pro-
observations in Green that since "the essence of fraud is deliberate deception or conceal-
ment," the contention that rule 10b-5 liability will attach in the absence of any deception or
misrepresentation is untenable. 533 F.2d at 1301.
13 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine this precise question. Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
"' See Brodsky, Rule 10b-5 Liability: The 'Ernst' Decision, 175 N.Y.L.J. 77, Apr. 21,
1976, at 2, col. 3. The equation made by the Second Circuit in Marshel and Green between
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty would seem to be difficult to sustain in the wake of
Hochfelder. The breach of fiduciary duty theory of liability has a liberal requirement regard-
ing the state of mind of the person charged with the duty, and probably relatively few of those
guilty of breaching a fiduciary duty would have satisfied the scienter requirement of
Hochfelder. See id.
M See, e.g., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,722
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). This decision is discussed in Frome, Shrinking Liability Under 10(b) and
10b-5, 176 N.Y.L.J. 85, Nov. 1, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
1- 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976). The implications of the Northway decision are considered in
Frome, Proxy Statements and 'Northway' Ruling, 176 N.Y.L.J. 66, Oct. 4, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
"1' 96 S. Ct. at 2133. The trend against expansion of federal regulation of securities
transactions, as exemplified by the Hochfelder and Northway decisions, is noted in Frome,
Shrinking Liability Under 10(b) and 10b-5, 176 N.Y.L.J. 85, Nov. 1, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
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posed going private rules.'35 In a letter to the SEC commenting on
the rules, the committee inquired as to the limits of the fairness
requirement in these transactions, and observed that:
Having embarked upon an attempt to require "fairness" in this
one type of corporate transaction, how could the Commission re-
frain from similar action in other areas?
If the evidence adduced during the Commission's
investigatory hearing leads it to conclude that a federal fairness
standard is necessary, the Commission should meet the issue head-
on by recommending legislation to Congress.' 36
Similar considerations would seem to apply when, as in Green and
Marshel, rule 10b-5 is expanded into those areas of substantive
corporate law heretofore reserved to the states.
Closely related to the problem of defining new limits for rule
10b-5 once it is extended to reach internal corporate matters is the
sensitive policy question of federalizing state corporation laws. At
least one highly regarded commentator has advocated that some
types of minimum federal standard be established for regulating
substantive corporate matters.'37 While the Green and Marshel deci-
sions might be viewed by some as a positive first step in this direc-
tion,' 38 the better view would seem to be that if such federalization
of state corporation laws is to occur, the proper way is by statute
and not through progressively more elastic interpretations of rule
10b-5. '31
,2 For a discussion of the proposed rules, see notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
'3' Letter from the American Bar Association, Committee on Federal Regulation of Se-
curities of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law to George A. Fitzsimmons,
Secretary, SEC, reprinted in TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS, supra note 5, at 113, 123. Similar
concerns were expressed in Brodsky, State Going-Private Laws-Dead orAlive?, 175 N.Y.L.J.
39, Feb. 27, 1976, at 14, col. 3.
"' See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 705 (1974). Professor Cary argues that the corporation laws of the individual states reflect
an absurd "race for the bottom, with Delaware in the lead," as a result of state legislative
policies designed more to attract incorporations and thereby increase tax revenues than
promote public confidence in corporate management.
" See, e.g., Note, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going Private:
Marshel v. AFW Fabrics Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184,
1196-97 (1976).
,I" See also Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 699-700 (1974), wherein Professor Cary expresses similar sentiments. Similarly,
Professor Borden maintains that such an extension of the federal securities laws would create
problems parallel to those finally resolved when Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1939),
brought almost 100 years of federal common law development tumbling down. Borden, supra




Transactions involving a company which is going private have
caused much concern, not only as to how these transactions should
be regulated, but also as to who should do the regulating. At stake
are the competing interests of a state in governing the internal activ-
ities of entities created by state law and of the federal government
in protecting shareholders through the federal securities laws.
Initially, demands for extension of the federal securities laws to
provide protection for potential freeze-out victims of going private
transactions were predicated upon the absence of any effective state
law remedy which could deal with the problem. The assumption was
that the only remedy available under state law was the often inade-
quate exercise of appraisal rights. Recent decisions involving the
application of state laws to this type of transaction, however, have
shown that this is not necessarily true. Shareholders who have
brought actions predicated on state law generally have not seen
their requests for injunctive relief rejected summarily, but rather
have achieved careful review of the substance of the transactions,
and often have been the beneficiaries of equitable and legal relief
previously thought not to be available. In some cases, the courts
have been resourceful and innovative in fashioning entirely new
remedies. The effect of these decisions is to make further extensions
of the federal securities laws into these areas involving corporate
management more difficult to justify, since the need for such an
extension was predicated on the absence of adequate state law rem-
edies.
Even if it is assumed, however, that state law remedies are
inadequate, it is difficult to see how existing federal securities laws
can be stretched, within reason, to provide either federal courts or
the SEC with the authority to review the substance of these transac-
tions. The securities laws have always been interpreted to impose
only disclosure requirements, and, barring only the most exigent
circumstances, should be so applied. The going private cases do not
appear to present such circumstances.
Lawrence W. Thomas
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